California Insurance Litigation Blog

A recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision reaffirmed the need for plan administrators to state the reasoning behind their denial of coverage.  In Lukas v. United Behavioral Health,  __ F.3d __, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 1230 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2013) the Ninth Circuit was faced with evaluating whether the district court properly weighed the factors necessary to determine if there was an abuse of discretion by the plan administrator in denying the benefits to the claimant.  On de novo review, the Ninth Circuit found that the lower court failed to properly weigh these factors and reversed the decision, remanding the case back to the district court for a benefit award and further necessary proceedings related to that award.

On November 27, 2012, following a trial before Judge Cormac J. Carney of the United States Federal District Court for the Central District of California, Robert J. McKennon and Scott E. Calvert of the McKennon Law Group secured a victory for their client in a lawsuit against Sun Life and Health Insurance Company.  Representing the claimant, Mr. Evans, the McKennon Law Group convinced the District Court that Sun Life abused its discretion in denying Mr. Evans’ claim for long-term disability benefits and that Mr. Evans is entitled to receive his disability benefits that Sun Life denied him.

Under ERISA, insurers/claim administrators are required to give every insurance claim a full and fair review. Courts in the Ninth Circuit have construed this requirement in a manner that requires insurers/claim administrators to do more than simply have an in-house physician or nurse conduct a paper review of medical records.  This trend continues with the decision in Galloway, et. al. v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45866 (W.D. Wash.  April 28, 2011).

From 2000 to 2008, Galloway worked as a machinist for Turbine Engine Components Technologies Corporation (“TECT”).  On January 1, 2002, Lincoln National issued a group life insurance policy to TECT and on October 14, 2004, Galloway, a TECT employee at the time, enrolled in the policy.  The policy contains a provision ensuring continued coverage, without payment of premiums, if a participant becomes totally disabled.

In January 2008, Galloway stopped working at TECT due to Achilles tendonitis.  In July 2008, Galloway requested that Lincoln National grant him a waiver from paying premiums on his life insurance policy due to his total disability.  

The Thursday December 1, 2010 edition of the Los Angeles Daily Journal featured the article co-written by Robert J. McKennon and M. Scott Koller, entitled “In ERISA Cases, The Standard of Review Really Does Matter,” in the Perspective column. It explains why it is important to identify and appropriately utilize the Standard of Review in ERISA cases.  The article is posted below with permission of Daily Journal Corp. (2010).

Please click the image to view/print the article in Adobe

Litigation pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) is rather unique.  Unlike most cases, ERISA disputes are based on a limited scope of permissible evidence.  The range of that scope is ultimately dependent on which standard of review is employed by the courts.  Typically, when the standard of review is abuse of discretion, the scope of admissible evidence is limited to what was before the claims administrator when the claims decision was made, i.e. the “administrative record.”  The reason for this limited subset of evidence is based on the sole question before the court, namely “Did the claim administrative abuse its discretion in rendering its decision?”  Obviously, evidence discovered or submitted after the claims decision was made would be irrelevant to that question, hence the narrow scope.  However, when the standard of review is de novo, the question before the court changes to whether or not the claimant is entitled to benefits.  In other words, it is simply whether or not the claimant is disabled.  Consequently, this change in question also alters the realm of admissible evidence. 

Recently, the court in Ermovick vs. Mitchell, Silberberg & Knump LLP Long Term Disability Plan, 2010 WL 3956819 (Decided October 8, 2010), addressed the question of whether evidence of procedural deficiencies should be considered in the context of a de novo review.  The facts are relatively straight forward.  James Ermovick worked as a word processor at the law firm of Mitchell, Silberberg & Knump.  His claim for disability benefits was based on depression, anxiety and pain radiating in his back and neck due to myeloradiculopathy.  Ermovick claimed to be totally disabled from any occupation while Prudential, the claims administrator, believed his disability to be temporary and therefore denied his benefits claim. 

Recently, in Montour v. Harford Life & Accident, 582 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in one of its most important cases, adopted a new standard of reviewing ERISA abuse of discretion cases where the insurer has a conflict of interest.  The court held that a “modicum of evidence in the record supporting the administrator’s decision will not alone suffice in the face of such a conflict, since this more traditional application of the abuse of discretion standard allowed no room for weighing the extent to which the administrator’s decision may have been motivated by improper considerations.”  Further, the court in Montour explained that a reviewing court must also take into account the administrator’s conflict of interest as a factor in the abuse of discretion analysis.  This was significant because the appeals court gave a comprehensive description of the “signs of bias” it found were exhibited by Hartford throughout the decision-making process. These included overstatement of and excessive reliance upon Montour’s activities in the surveillance videos; Hartford’s decision to conduct a paper review rather than an “in-person medical evaluation;” Hartford’s insistence that Montour produce objective proof of his pain level; and Hartford’s failure to deal with and distinguish the Social Security Administration’s contrary disability decision. The appeals court also noted Hartford’s “failure to present extrinsic evidence of any effort on its part to ‘assure accurate claims assessment.’”

Sacks v. Standard Ins. Co., __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2009 WL 4307558 (C.D. Cal. 2009) is one of the first cases to address the abuse of discretion standard of review since the Ninth Circuit’s important decision in Montour.  In Sacks, the claimant was a mortgage underwriter for Countrywide Home Loans.  Standard Insurance Company (“Standard”) was the claims administrator and insurer for the Countrywide Home Loans Long Term Disability Plan (the “Plan”).  After her claim for long-term disability benefits was denied, the claimant sued Standard Insurance in federal courts for benefits under the ERISA.

The court recognized that the Plan granted Standard with discretionary authority.   However, since Standard provided the funds and made the decision concerning benefits, it operated under a structural conflict of interest.  At issue was how to apply the standard of review in light of the conflict of interest and the recent Ninth Circuit opinion in Montour.  Here, the court recognized that the “abuse of discretion” standard of review does not change just because there is a conflict of interest.  Instead, the factual circumstances surrounding the conflict of interest is a factor providing weight in the overall analysis of whether an abuse of discretion occurred.  As a result, the court in Sacks gave greater weight to the conflict of interest for a variety of reasons including because Standard used an erroneous occupation criteria to evaluate Plaintiff’s claim, failed to consider the effects of the claimant’s medication on her ability to perform her own occupation, and failed to adequately investigate the claim.  In addition, the court highlighted the fact that Standard failed to conduct follow-up testing as recommended by the IME physician and instead merely accepted the part of the physician’s conclusion that supported its claims decision.  These actions, the court found, warranted greater skepticism of Standard’s claims decision.  Accordingly, the court found that Standard had abused its discretion and reversed the claim decision by awarding the plaintiff benefits.

Expect to see more district courts to focus their analysis on these and other self-interest factors as they assess how much weight to give to an insurer’s conflict of interest.   Also expect to see more district courts applying the Montour analysis to find that administrators have acted in a manner that evidences their self-interest and to award more ERISA participants their benefits under insured benefit plans.

After the United States Supreme Court decided MetLife Ins. Co. v. Glenn in which the Court held that a reviewing court must consider the conflict of interest arising from the dual role of an insurer acting as a plan administrator and payor of plan benefits as a factor in determining whether the insurer abused its discretion in denying benefits, several courts have struggled with this standard.  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified how courts within the Ninth Circuit will apply this standard in Montour v. Hartford Life & Accident, 582 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2009).  In Montour, the court adopted a new standard of reviewing ERISA abuse of discretion cases where the insurer has a conflict of interest. The court held that a “modicum of evidence in the record supporting the administrator’s decision will not alone suffice in the face of such a conflict, since this more traditional application of the abuse of discretion standard allowed no room for weighing the extent to which the administrator’s decision may have been motivated by improper considerations.”

Robert Montour was a telecommunications manager for Conexant Systems, Inc. His employer provided him with a group long-term disability plan governed by ERISA. Hartford was both the insurer and claims administrator of the plan. The plan granted Hartford discretionary authority to interpret plan terms and to determine eligibility for benefits.

Montour applied for and received disability benefits, initially for an acute stress disorder, in 2003. In 2004, Montour consulted an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Kenneth Kengla, about knee and back pain and subsequently underwent surgery. Dr. Kengla diagnosed Montour with degenerative changes in both areas and notified Hartford that Montour was suffering from physical disability which prevented him from returning to the labor force. Dr. Kengla listed numerous restrictions on Montour’s physical activities.

In November and December 2005 Hartford conducted surveillance on Montour over the course of four days. Video footage from this surveillance depicted Montour driving his car along with other activities. Shortly thereafter, a Hartford investigator conducted a personal interview with Montour at his home, during which Montour listed a “bad back, [an] arthritic right knee, and sleep apnea” as the “disabling medical condition(s)” preventing him from returning to work. He also described an inability to concentrate, which he attributed to the medication he must take to treat his “constant pain.” Montour acknowledged that the surveillance video footage accurately depicted his level of functionality.

In May 2006 a Hartford nurse case manager submitted a letter to Dr. Kengla indicating that Montour was capable of performing “sedentary to light” work and soliciting their agreement. Dr. Kengla indicated that he disagreed with Hartford’s conclusions, citing Montour’s persistent orthopedic symptoms and physical restrictions.

In July 2006 Hartford hired a consulting physician, Dr. Gale Brown, to conduct a file review. Dr. Brown concluded that medical evidence supported the existence of a lower back condition but that Dr. Kengla’s offered restrictions were excessive. He acknowledged that the medical evidence supported Montour’s chronic pain but found that Montour was nevertheless capable of working full-time with modest restrictions, such as changing positions every thirty to forty-five minutes.

After Hartford enlisted a vocational rehabilitation expert to compile an Employability Analysis Report which concluded that Montour was capable of working in a high-level managerial capacity in five different fields, in August 2006 Hartford denied his claim. Montour appealed this decision and included a vocational appraisal report which concluded that Montour was “not employable in any setting” and that Hartford’s decision was based on numerous mistakes, including a disregard for the fact that the Social Security Administration (SSA) considered Montour to be “totally disabled.”

In response, Hartford hired a physician to conduct a second file review. The physician reviewed Montour’s records for evidence of a physical condition that would preclude sedentary work and, like Dr. Brown, found none. He noted in particular a lack of objective, clinical data demonstrating the extent to which Montour’s pain impacted his functionality. He also noted that Montour’s activities depicted on the surveillance videos exceeded the activity requirements of a “sedentary” job.

In light of concerns raised in the vocational appraisal report, Hartford requested a vocational specialist to conduct an Employability Analysis Report addendum, which reached the same conclusion as the initial Employability Analysis Report regarding the sedentary nature and thus the feasibility of the five proposed managerial positions. In February 2007, a Hartford appeal specialist affirmed the company’s previous decision to terminate Montour’s benefits. In a bench trial, the district court rendered its decision in favor of Hartford, upholding its denial.

In reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit first explained that when an ERISA plan grants the administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan, the court reviews the decision for abuse of discretion. The court agreed with the district court that the abuse of discretion standard applied and that Hartford had a conflict of interest. However, the appeals court criticized the district court’s application of the “clear error” test, explaining that a reviewing court must also take into account the administrator’s conflict of interest as a factor in the abuse of discretion analysis. The appeals court concluded that the district court’s decision did not adequately balance the conflict factors. Accordingly, the appeals court proceeded to do so.

The appeals court gave a comprehensive description of the “signs of bias” it found were exhibited by Hartford throughout the decision-making process. These included overstatement of and excessive reliance upon Montour’s activities in the surveillance videos Hartford’s decision to conduct a paper review rather than an “in-person medical evaluation;” Hartford’s insistence that Montour produce objective proof of his pain level; and Hartford’s failure to deal with and distinguish the Social Security Administration’s contrary disability decision. The appeals court also noted Hartford’s “failure to present extrinsic evidence of any effort on its part to ‘assure accurate claims assessment.’”

The appeals court concluded that Hartford’s bias had infiltrated the entire administrative decision-making process, leading the court to accord significant weight to the conflict of interest. Weighing all of the factors together, the court concluded that Hartford’s conflict of interest improperly motivated its decision to terminate Montour’s benefits. The court reversed and remanded the matter for entry of judgment in favor of Montour and for reinstatement of long-term disability benefits.